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Medford v. Lynch: North Carolina's Shift to the Minority
Rule Regarding Inheritance Taxation and Will
Compromise Agreements
In Medford v. Lynch1 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the
North Carolina General Assembly's decision to impose inheritance taxes in ac-
cordance with the transfers under a compromise agreement when such an agree-
ment is incorporated into a consent judgment in a caveat proceeding.2 The
majority view-previously followed by North Carolina-imposes inheritance
taxes in accordance with the will provisions.3 Medford was the first opportunity
for a North Carolina appellate court to interpret North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 105-2(1) 4 since its amendment in 1974- to provide that inheritance
taxes shall be imposed upon a transfer "when the transfer is made pursuant to a
final judgment entered in a proceeding to caveat a will." 6 The Medford court
found that a consent judgment qualified as a final judgment7 and therefore held
that inheritance taxes should be imposed in accordance with the transfers under
a compromise agreement when the agreement is incorporated into a consent
judgment.8 This Note will explain the majority and minority views on imposing
inheritance taxes; analyze the Medford decision under section 105-2(1); review
the history of inheritance taxes in North Carolina concerning will compromise
agreements; discuss the policy arguments behind both the minority and majority
1. 67 N.C. App. 543, 313 S.E.2d 593 (1984).
2. Id. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595. This places North Carolina in the minority of states. See 42
Am. JUR. 2D Inheritance, Estate, And Gift Taxes § 76 (1969) (discussing the majority and minority
views on effect of compromise of will contest). A "caveat proceeding" is a proceeding undertaken in
the proper courts to prevent (temporarily or provisionally) the proving of a will. . . ." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
3. See Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C. 636, 639-40, 97 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1957) (citing Annot., 36
A.L.R. 2D 917 (1954)). See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 2, §§ 71, 76 (1969) (discussing the
majority and minority views on taxation effect of compromise of will contest). The majority view
also holds that transfers should be taxed according to intestate succession, rather than according to a
compromise agreement, when decedent died intestate. Id. § 71. All further references in this Note
to the majority tax according to the will view also apply to taxation according to intestacy.
4. The section reads:
A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property, real or personal, or
of any interest therein or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise, to persons or corpora-
tions, in the following cases:
(1) When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this State from any person
dying seized or possessed of the property while a resident of the State, or when the transfer
is made pursuant to a final judgment entered in a proceeding to caveat a will executed by
any person dying seized of the property while a resident of this State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
5. Act of April 1, 1974, ch. 1287, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984)).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984). The section quoted was added by a 1974
amendment cited at note 5.
7. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545-46, 313 S.E.2d at 594-95.
8. Id. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595. The language of § 105-2(1) implies that a compromise agree-
ment which is not incorporated into a final consent judgment will not qualify for taxation according
to the compromise, but must be taxed according to the transfers specified by the will or by intestacy.
views; and briefly explain why the minority view, adopted by North Carolina, is
the better view.
Two views exist regarding the correct method of taxing transfers from an
estate when the will or intestate distribution has been contested and a compro-
mise agreement between the heirs or devisees and the contestants has been con-
summated.9 The majority view holds that the tax should be imposed on
transfers as provided in the will even though the compromise agreement may
provide for a different distribution.10 Under this view a devisee would pay in-
heritance taxes on his total bequest under the will, even though he may not
receive the entire bequest because of the compromise agreement. A contestant
not named in the will would not pay any tax on the property he receives."1 The
minority view holds that the inheritance tax should be imposed on transfers
made in accordance with the compromise agreement, thereby taxing a devisee,
heir, or contestant only on the property he actually receives. 12 Because of these
two views, the difference in inheritance taxes paid by each party to a will contest
can vary substantially.' 3
In Medford plaintiff Bobby Lee Medford was executor and sole beneficiary
of the estate of Mary Clemens under a 1978 will. 14 After Medford probated this
will, Robert McLendon instituted a caveat proceeding to probate a 1977 will,
supposedly executed by Clemens, that made McLendon a devisee.15 Patrick
Span and Claudia Span Johns, representing all of Clemens' heirs at law, inter-
vened in the caveat proceeding.' 6 During the trial all parties executed a com-
promise agreement which provided that the 1978 will would be probated, but
that the estate would be distributed in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment. 17 The jury determined that the 1978 will was Clemens' last will and testa-
ment, and the trial court entered a consent judgment to that effect. The court
ordered that the estate be distributed in accordance with the terms of the com-
promise agreement.' 8
As executor of the Clemens estate, Medford filed a North Carolina Inheri-
9. See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 2, § 76 (discussing both the majority and minority
views on effect of compromise of will contest).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Cochran's Ex'r & Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 661, 44 S.W.2d 603,
605 (1931).
12. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903-04 (1919); 42
AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 2, § 76.
13. An heir or devisee would have to pay inheritance tax on his total bequest under the major-
ity view; he would only pay inheritance tax on the part of the bequest he actually received under the
minority view. Also, tax rates and exemption amounts for beneficiaries vary according to the close-
ness in kinship of the beneficiary and the decedent. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-4,-S (1979 & Supp.
1984). The majority, taxation according to the will view, can deny the advantages of such provisions
to a contestant-beneficiary under a compromise agreement if he is closer in kin to the decedent than
was the devisee.
14. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 543, 313 S.E.2d at 593.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The compromise agreement provided for a distribution as follows: fifty percent to Med-
ford, twenty-eight percent to McLendon, and eleven percent each to Span and Johns. Id.
18. Id. at 543-44, 313 S.E.2d at 593.
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tance Tax Return, computing the tax due based on the transfers under the con-
sent judgment. 19 Defendant Department of Revenue ignored the consent order,
computing the estate's inheritance tax liability in accordance with the terms of
the will and assessing Medford $4,845.92 in additional taxes, penalties, and in-
terest. 20 Medford paid the assessment, was denied a refund, and sued to recover
the amount paid.21 In the resulting nonjury trial, the presiding judge ruled in
favor of the Department of Revenue and concluded, as a matter of law, that
Medford was required by section 105-2(1) to determine the inheritance tax in
accordance with the terms of the will.
22
A unanimous court of appeals reversed, ruling that section 105-2(1) re-
quired Medford to compute the inheritance tax in accordance with the compro-
mise agreement distributions contained in the consent judgment.2 3 The
Department of Revenue had contended that the 1957 case of Pulliam v.
Thrash24 was controlling.25 In Pulliam the North Carolina Supreme Court had
held that "the succession tax is computable in accordance with the terms of the
will, unaffected by the compromise agreement" which had been incorporated
into a consent judgment.2 6 The Medford court, however, noted that Pulliam
was decided prior to the amendment of section 105-2(1),27 which added that a
transfer is to be taxed "when the transfer is made pursuant to a final judgment
entered in a proceeding to caveat a will." 28 The court found that the legislature,
through this amendment, intended to change the Pulliam result and held that
section 105-2(1) as amended clearly required that the inheritance tax be com-
puted on transfers in accordance with the final judgment in a caveat
proceeding. 29
The Department of Revenue also argued that the consent judgment was
only a contract between the parties and did not constitute a "final judgment" as
intended by section 105-2(1).30 The court disagreed,3 1 noting that the North
Carolina Supreme Court had held that:
Once the court adopts the agreement of the parties and sets it
forth as a judgment of the court. . . the contractual character of the
agreement is subsumed into the court ordered judgment. At that point
the court and the parties are no longer dealing with a mere contract
19. Id. at 544, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957).
25. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
26. Pulliam, 245 N.C. at 639, 97 S.E.2d at 256 (quoting Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2D 918 (1954)).
"Succession tax" is merely a synonym for inheritance tax.
27. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984).
29. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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between the parties.3 2
Therefore, the court held "that a consent judgment entered in a caveat proceed-
ing is, absent any evidence of collusion, a final judgment for purposes of section
105-2(1)." 3 3 Accordingly, the court correctly held that the inheritance tax
should have been computed according to the compromise agreement transfers
instead of according to the will provisions. 34
Until 1937 North Carolina followed the majority rule of computing inheri-
tance taxes according to the distributions made under the will or by intestate
succession. 35 The inheritance tax statute was then amended to provide expressly
that when an estate was distributed in accordance with a compromise agree-
ment, inheritance taxes should be computed according to that agreement.3 6
This change, however, did not last long. In 1941 the legislature again amended
the inheritance tax statute, deleting the provision dealing with compromise
agreements and realigning North Carolina with the majority view of taxation
according to the will. 37 When the statute was amended to its present form in
1974, North Carolina rejoined the minority view of taxation according to the
compromise agreement.38
Although the North Carolina statute governing inheritance taxes has
shifted between the majority and minority views, all pre-Medford cases concern-
ing inheritance taxation in North Carolina were decided under the statute when
it reflected the majority view. These cases, therefore, supported taxation accord-
ing to the will.3 9
32. Id. at 545-46, 313 S.E.2d at 594-95 (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 407-
08, 298 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1983)).
33. Id. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595.
34. Id.
35. See, eg., Act of May 9, 1935, ch. 371, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 429,429; Act of March 10,
1925, ch. 101, § 6, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 116, 119; Act of March 9, 1915, ch. 285, § 6, 1915 N.C.
Sess. Laws 355, 357; Act of March 15, 1901, ch. 9, § 12, 1901 N.C. Sess. Laws 116, 123. Until 1939
North Carolina's revenue act had to be renewed every two years. The statutes cited are examples of
the inheritance tax statute during this period.
36. Act of March 13, 1937, ch. 127, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 170. This change reflected the
minority view. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
37. Act of Feb. 28, 1941, ch. 50, 1941 N.C. Sess. Laws 66.
38. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1287, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984)).
39. See, eg., Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957); Bailey v. McLain, 215
N.C. 150, 1 S.E.2d 372 (1939); Greene v. Lynch, 51 N.C. App. 665, 277 S.E.2d 454 (1981); In re
McCoy, 39 N.C. App. 52, 249 S.E.2d 473 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 585, 254 S.E.2d 36
(1979). In McCoy, which was decided four years after § 105-2(1) was amended, the court had to
apply the statute as it appeared in 1973, the year of the decedent's death. Its holding therefore
follows the majority view.
Pulliam was the first case in which the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly recognized the
majority view. The Pulliam court held that an executor must compute inheritance taxes according
to the distributions in the will, basing its decision on the 1957 version of § 105-2(1). Pulliam, 245
N.C. at 639, 97 S.E.2d at 255-56. Section 105-2 did not then include a provision regarding caveat
proceedings or compromise agreements. The court stated that:
Our statutes impose inheritance taxes upon transfers of property by will, by intestate
laws or in contemplation of death. . . .No provision [in section 105-2] is made for the
assessment of inheritance taxes on a different basis, because, pursuant to a contract made
by the devisees after testator's death, the ultimate disposition differs in whole or in part
from that prescribed by the will.
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North Carolina's recognition of the majority view, however, was expressly
rejected in Medford.4° The Medford court found that the North Carolina legis-
lature, through its 1974 amendment of section 105-2(1), had adopted the minor-
ity view-taxation according to the compromise agreement.41 The court of
appeals' interpretation of this statute is consistent with the statutory language
and, therefore, is correct.
The power to levy an inheritance tax and to specify how the tax should be
computed is entirely within the province of the general assembly.42 The North
Carolina General Assembly, by amending section 105-2(1) in 1974, has provided
that North Carolina should follow the minority rule and tax transfers according
to their distribution in a compromise agreement if the agreement is incorporated
into a final judgment in a caveat proceeding.43 Although it is clear that the
legislature has amended section 105-2(1) to adopt the minority rule, the reasons
for the legislature's reversal are unclear. Because no legislative history exists in
North Carolina to identify the supporting arguments behind the amendment, an
examination of the public policies supporting both the majority and minority
views clarifies the North Carolina General Assembly's change in position.44
Four major rationales support the majority, taxation according to the will
view. First, some jurisdictions reason that the transfer to be taxed occurs on the
date of the decedent's death, and the tax is fixed as of that time.45 Any subse-
Id.
40. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595.
41. Id. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
42. See In re Morris' Estate, 138 N.C. 259, 262-63, 50 S.E. 682, 683 (1905). The Morris court
stated that:
[Tihe right to take property by devise or descent is not one of the natural rights of man, but
is the creature of the law . . . . The authority which confers such rights may impose
conditions upon them, or take them away entirely. Accordingly, it is held that the states
may tax the privilege, grant exemptions, discriminate between relatives and between these
and strangers, and are not precluded from the exercise of this power by constitutional
provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation. Neither is it necessary to the
validity of the tax that the state Constitution should contain a specific delegation of power
authorizing the Legislature to impose such taxation. The power of the Legislature over the
subject of taxation is absolute unless restricted by the Constitution of the state or nation.
Id.
43. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
44. Although each state's statute governing inheritance taxes is different, the public policy rea-
soning behind these statutes, examined in existing case law, should be applicable and persuasive
irrespective of the differences in the statutes' wording. Also, whether the majority or minority view
will benefit the state or the taxpayer depends upon the facts peculiar to each situation; neither view
consistently benefits one party more than the other.
The federal government's taxation on transfers at death is an estate tax based on a decedent's
total estate, not an inheritance tax upon particular inheritances. Therefore, the federal government's
attitude towards the majority and minority view will not be examined in detail. The vast majority of
cases dealing with the federal estate tax and compromise agreements deal with charity-legatees who
agree to pay a portion of the bequest to decedent's heirs at law in return for the heir's withdrawal of
a will contest suit. The general rule in these cases favors the minority view and taxes the amount
received by the heirs, while the charity's share is nontaxable. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2D 917, 920-21
(1954). Two earlier cases, however, did involve a federal inheritance tax and taxed the distributions
made in accordance with the compromise agreements. See Page v. Rives, 18 F. Cas. 990 (C.C.W.D.
Va. 1877) (No. 10,666); McCoy v. Gill, 156 F. 985 (C.C.D. Mass. 1907).
45. See MacKenzie v. Wright, 31 Ariz. 272, 252 P. 521 (1927); People v. Upson, 338 Ill. 145,
170 N.E. 276 (1930); Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div. v. Kitchin, 119 Ind.
[Vol. 63
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quent compromise agreement is merely a contract by which an heir or devisee
assigns a part of his interest in the decedent's estate to the contestant. 46 Second,
since the will is an essential link in the chain of title47 and transfers in the will
take effect at the testator's death, seisin immediately vests in the devisee upon
testator's death. If the taxable transfer was made pursuant to a later compro-
mise agreement, the seisin would not be vested in anyone from the time of testa-
tor's death until the compromise agreement became effective, violating the
doctrine that someone must always possess the seisin. 45
The third rationale supporting the taxation according to the will view is
that it, unlike the minority view, offers no opportunity for tax avoidance. 49 The
minority view would allow a contestant and an heir or devisee to arrange collu-
sively the property distribution so as to take advantage of favorable tax rates and
exemptions.50 This manipulation of taxes would, according to the majority posi-
tion, wrongfully deprive the state of inheritance taxes.5 1
A fourth rationale in favor of the majority view is that statutory provisions
allowing taxation according to the compromise agreement are unnecessary be-
cause the same result can be reached between the compromising parties by ap-
portioning the total inheritance tax to be paid in the compromise agreement.52
The parties can specify in a tax apportionment clause that each will pay a certain
percentage of the tax due, or apportion the taxes consistently with the property
each receives from the estate. 53 Thus, the majority view can provide an equita-
ble allocation of taxes according to the property actually received by a benefici-
ary while still complying with the doctrinal requirement that inheritance taxes
App. 422, 86 N.E.2d 96 (1949) (en bane); Cochran's Ex'r and Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky.
656, 44 S.W.2d 603 (1931); Baxter v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N.E. 854 (1911); In re Cook's
Estate, 187 N.Y. 253, 79 N.E. 991 (1907).
46. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div. v. Kitchin, 119 Ind. App. 422, 424,
86 N.E.2d 96, 97 (1949)(en banc); Cochran's Ex'r and Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 659,
44 S.W.2d 603, 604 (1931).
47. Borish v. Zink, 2 N.J. Super. 42, 44, 64 A.2d 461, 461 (1949).
48. This argument concerning seisin seems less significant today because of the reduced empha-
sis on seisin in modem property law.
49. See Note, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1941, 19 N.C.L. REv. 435,
527 (1941).
50. See People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Il. 168, 99 N.E. 377 (1912); Hart v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1942); In re Gartside's Estate, 357 Mo. 181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947);
In re Kierstead's Estate, 122 Neb. 694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); In re Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28
A. 353 (1894). Many states following the minority view, however, require that the compromise
agreement be entered into in good faith and for purposes other than tax avoidance. These states
guard against tax avoidance compromises through the use of fraud statutes and by requiring that
compromise agreements be incorporated into a court judgment or decree, thereby providing judicial
review of the agreement. See Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 222, 23 A.2d 682, 684
(1942); State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80-81, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 703, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932).
51. Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 222, 23 A.2d 682, 684 (1932).
52. See Brown v. McLoughlin, 287 Mass. 15, 190 N.E. 795 (1934); Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C.
636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957).
53. Cohn v. Cohn, 20 Cal. 2d 65, 68, 123 P.2d 833, 835 (1942); Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C.
636, 640, 97 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1957); In re Estate of Rendsland, 92 Wash. 2d 185, 190, 594 P.2d 1346,
1349 (1979). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R. 3D 691, 717 (1954) (discussing tax apportionment
provisions in will compromise agreements).
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tax transfers at decedent's death. 54
The minority, taxation according to the compromise agreement view also
possesses significant public policy support. Five rationales have been advanced
in support of the minority view. First, taxation according to the compromise
provides a more equitable tax allocation.55 Under the minority view, only the
property actually received by a beneficiary under the compromise agreement is
taxed. 56 If a compromise agreement significantly alters the transfers mentioned
in a will, basing the inheritance tax due on the will provisions would impose an
inequitable tax burden on the devisees. 57
Second, taxation according to the compromise agreement more closely fol-
lows the legislative intent implicit in inheritance taxes-to tax the transfer of the
decedent's property.5 8 Inheritance taxes do not tax a decedent's estate, but
rather tax the receipt of property from that estate.59 A third rationale support-
ing the minority view is based on the relationship between a testator and the
contestant of his will. 60 To have standing to contest, a party must have an inter-
est that would be adversely affected by probate of the contested will. 61 Thus, an
interested party could include heirs at law and beneficiaries under a prior will.62
Because of this interest requirement many courts have held that any property
transferred to a contestant as a result of a compromise agreement should be
treated as having passed under the laws concerning descent and distribution to
an heir of the same relationship as the contestant was to the testator and taxed
accordingly. 63 This result seemingly would create a part-will part-intestacy dis-
54. Under the majority view, however, the tax would be assessed against the beneficiaries under
the will. See In re Cook's Estate, 187 N.Y. 253, 259-60, 79 N.E. 991, 993 (1907). Therefore, the
majority view would ignore any favorable tax rates or exemptions a contestant close in kin to the
decedent might possess that the minority view would allow. See infra note 63 and accompanying
text.
55. See In re Estate of Thorson, 150 Minn. 464, 185 N.W. 508 (1921); State ex rel. Hilton v.
Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919); In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 207
S.W.2d 273 (1947); In re Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); In re Pepper's
Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28 A. 353 (1894).
56. See State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903 (1919).
57. See In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 185, 207 S.W.2d 273, 275 (1947); Pepper's
Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 510, 28 A. 353, 353 (1894).
58. See Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1942); In re Estate of Thor-
son, 150 Minn. 464, 185 N.W. 508 (1921); State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172
N.W. 902 (1919); In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947).
59. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903 (1919); In re
Morris' Estate, 138 N.C. 259, 262, 50 S.E. 682, 683 (1905). Although transfers from an estate
theoretically are taxed as of the time of decedent's death and compromise agreements are entered
into after a decedent's death, the legislative intent of inheritance tax law overrides this discrepancy
and demands that the tax be computed on the property as it actually is distributed to the benefi-
ciaries. See State ex rel Hilton, 143 Minn. at 80, 172 N.W. at 903.
60. See People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Rice, 40 Colo. 508, 91 P. 33 (1907); Taylor v. State, 40
Ga. App. 295, 149 S.E. 321 (1929); Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1942);
In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947); In re Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb.
694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); In re Hastings' Estate, 183 Misc. 517, 49 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1944).
61. In re Will of Calhoun, 47 N.C. App. 472, 267 S.E.2d 385, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 90, 273
S.E.2d 311 (1980).
62. In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 184, 207 S.W.2d 273, 275 (1947); In re Will of
Belvin, 261 N.C. 275, 276, 134 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1964).
63. Taylor v. State, 40 Ga. App. 295, 295, 149 S.E. 321, 321 (1929); Hart v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 180 Md. 218, 222, 23 A.2d 682, 684 (1942); In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 184, 207
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tribution and would allow the transfers to be taxed according to the compromise
agreement while still meeting the doctrinal requirement that transfers be taxed
at the testator's death.64 The theory of partial renunciation also supports the
minority view. 65 Under this theory, when a beneficiary renounces a bequest or
legacy he is not taxed on the attempted transfer; the property passes through
intestacy and is taxed to the receiving heirs.6 6 Likewise, a devisee under a will
should not be taxed on his whole bequest if, as a result of a compromise agree-
ment, he does not receive the whole bequest; the amount passing under the com-
promise agreement should be treated as a partial renunciation by the devisee and
should be taxed to the recipients as if it were passing through intestacy.
67
The fourth public policy rationale in favor of the minority view is that taxa-
tion according to the compromise agreement encourages the settlement of will-
contest litigation.68 Because under the minority view a devisee or legatee must
pay inheritance taxes only on the amount received and not on the total bequest
or intestate share, a devisee or legatee should be more willing to compromise and
settle a will-contest suit.
69
The fifth rationale favoring the minority view deals with the requirement,
imposed by several states, that the compromise agreement be incorporated into a
court decree or judgment for the minority rule to apply.70 The possibility of an
invalid will may create uncertainty as to who is entitled to property passing
through a testator's estate.7 1 Therefore, the logical result in will-contest suits
would be to hold that no actual transfer of the estate assets occurs until a court
S.W.2d 273, 275 (1947). Treating the transfers under a compromise agreement as having passed
under the laws of descent and distribution would also meet the majority view's requirement that the
transfer to be taxed occur at the decedent's death.
64. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
65. See State ex reL Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81-82, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919);
In re Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932).
66. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81-82, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932).
67. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81-82, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932). Of course, under partial renunci-
ation the property renounced would pass through intestacy to the heirs at law as a class, not to a
specific "heir" as it would under a compromise agreement.
68. See State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932); Note, Taxation-Effect of North
Carolina Inheritance Tax on a Will Compromise Agreement, 36 N.C.L. REV. 236, 238 (1958). A
danger exists, however, that by encouraging settlements the minority view may also encourage a
devisee and contestant to avoid inheritance taxes by apportioning the property in such a manner as
to maximize the effect of favorable tax rates and exemptions available to parties close in kin to
decedent. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. By encouraging settlements, the minority
view also may tempt a devisee and contestant to withhold evidence concerning the invalidity of a will
in order to facilitate an agreement between themselves, possibly excluding rightful heirs. See Bailey
v. McLain, 215 N.C. 150, 158-59, 1 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1939) (Clarkson, J., dissenting). Both of these
dangers, however, can be minimized by requiring that the compromise agreement be incorporated
into a judgment, thus subjecting it to judicial review. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
69. State ex reL. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919).
70. See State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919); In re Estate
of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); Medford v. Lynch, 67 N.C. App. 543, 313 S.E.2d
593 (1984).
71. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903-04 (1919).
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enters a final decree or judgment providing for a valid distribution.72 Any such
decree or judgment would be treated as having occurred at decedent's death and
would be binding on all, unless a compromise agreement had been entered into
collusively. 73 The requirement that a compromise agreement be incorporated
into a final decree or judgment provides the court an opportunity to evaluate
whether the agreement was made collusively or solely to avoid taxes, rather than
to settle a bona fide controversy. 74 Therefore, to require incorporation of a com-
promise agreement into a judgment or decree refutes criticism that the minority
view allows taxation of transfers made after the decedent's death and encourages
tax avoidance.75
The minority view is the better of the two approaches. By taxing a benefici-
ary only on property he actually receives, the minority view provides a more
equitable result.76 Under this view, a devisee would not suffer any dispropor-
tionate inheritance tax hardship when he surrenders a portion of his bequest to a
will contestant in a compromise agreement. The majority view would force the
devisee to pay the inheritance tax on his total bequest under the will.
The minority view fulfills the legislative intent underlying inheritance
taxes-to tax the beneficiary of a transfer of estate property only on the amount
he actually receives. 7 7 Since the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that
"[a] law imposing an inheritance tax is to be liberally construed to effectuate the
intention of the Legislature,"'78 this result should be of primary importance.
Therefore, the Medford court was correct in its interpretation of section 105-2(1)
and its recognition of the minority view in North Carolina. The minority view
also best implements the testator's intent. A testator would not wish for an
intended devisee to pay inheritance taxes on property the devisee did not receive
while an intentionally omitted contestant to the will pays no taxes on property
received pursuant to a compromise agreement.
The criticisms of the minority view are unfounded. The principle criticism
is that the minority rule does not comply with the theoretical requirement that
72. Id. The court in State ex rel Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902,
903-04 (1919) stated:
Where a decedent has attempted to transfer his estate by a purported will, there is
frequently an uncertainty as to the persons who eventually will participate in the estate,
and the amount or value of the portion to be received; and there is also a possibility that
the transfer may after all be in virtue of the intestate law, and not through the will. The
will may turn out not properly executed, or invalid because of lack of testamentary capac-
ity or the exertion of undue influence. Therefore, in case of a contest between the benefi-
ciaries named in the will, or where the instrument is attacked by one claiming under the
intestate law, the practical proposition is that there is no actual transfer of any portion of
the estate until the final decree of distribution is made, or until a court of competent juris.
diction construes or determines the issue between the claimants. The decree so finally
entered relates back, and, of course, makes the transfer effectual as of the date of death.
73. Id.
74. Id.; Appellant's Brief at 7, Medford.
75. For a discussion of the majority view's criticism of these points, see supra notes 45-46 and
49-51 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
78. Watkins v. Shaw, 234 N.C. 96, 98, 65 S.E.2d 881, 883 (1951).
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inheritance taxes be levied on transfers at the time of testator's death.79 The
minority view, however, counters this criticism by implying that the property
the contestant received passes under the statutes of descent and distribution and
relates back to the date of the testator's death under the compromise agree-
ment. 80 This construction is supported by the close relationship that usually
exists between the contestant and the testator. 81 Therefore, the minority view
satisfies the requirement that transfers be taxed at the date of testator's death.
By interpreting section 105-2(1) to tax inheritances according to the distri-
butions in a compromise agreement when that agreement is incorporated into a
final judgment in a caveat proceeding, the Medford court has given judicial rec-
ognition to the minority view of taxation according to the compromise agree-
ment in North Carolina. This decision provides North Carolina with an
equitable inheritance tax law that best effectuates both the legislative intent of
the inheritance tax statute and the decedent's intent.
BRUCE ARCHER DENNING
79. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
81. See cases cited supra note 60.
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